I learned about negative space and early retreats at a coaching clinic in Florida conducted by our USMNT staff a few years back. I want to share some of the things gleaned from those sessions.
What is negative space?
Negative space is the area located behind the backs and in front of the goalkeeper.
This is the area that teams attacking a zonal defense want to play in.
The preferred method for attacking negative space is through balls or dump and runs. When done successfully, breakaways occur with defenders in a foot race with opposing forwards to see who can get to the ball first.
Naturally zonal defenses have a strategy to defend against balls being played through or in behind their backs. This strategy is known as Early Retreat. There is a very simple cue to be read for when to begin an early retreat: When an opposing ball carrier is not being pressured, the backs must begin an immediate retreat.
By giving ground the backs are shrinking the amount of open space behind them and in front of the goalkeeper.
They are also providimg themselves time to solidify their spacing and support angles amongst themselves.
Executing an early retreat also provides midfield and forward teammates time to gain proper position behind the ball and bring pressure to the ball carrier.
So, how far back should the backs retreat before making a stand?
The backs Hold! once pressure on the ball has been re-established in front of them.
OR
The backs retreat until they reach a position approximately 25 yards from their own goal. At this point the 4 backs and goalkeeper should normally be able to defend until help arrives in the form of midfielders and / or forward teammates.
Key Consideration for backs playing near the center line: Normal spacing when defending in the defensive third is approximately 10 yards between backs. They can fairly easily cover the width of the penalty area (44 yards) and a bit more. However, when the ball is in the middle or attacking thirds of the field the spacing of the backs is often much greater. Typical horizontal spacing between backs near the center line can be as great as 20 yards. It is much more difficult to support one another at that spacing than it is at 10 yard intervals. The spacing is greater near the center line or in the attacking third because the backs are in support of the attack more so than in support of one another.
Another Key Consideration for backs playing near the center line is when one or more of them push forward into the attack. The vertical spacing between backs can go from relatively flat to the normal 7 - 10 yard support drops all the way to one or more backs being pushed 25-30 yards forward in support of the attack. Early retreats allow the backs to consolidate their shape and regain the necessary angles for properly supporting one another before fully engaging the attack.
The strategy behind early retreats is to slow the opponents attack thereby providing time for the team to regain its shape.
Teams that allow their backs to step to pressure the ball in the middle third of the field before their spacing is consolidated open themselves to being attacked via through balls. It can lead to a lot of unnecessary running towards your own goal and having your team strung out over 40-60 yards of play from which it is nearly impossible to support on defense or on attack. It's a recipe for disaster.
An amazing thing often occurs when a team executes early retreat properly. Players are taught that when they have open space in front of them they should take it via the dribble. Is it faster to advance the ball via the dribble or by passing the ball forward? Yep, inviting the opposing ball carrier to dribble at a retreating back line is all part of the strategy of slowing the attack while actively denying negative space thereby allowing teammates time to recover and pressure the ball.
Backs in a zonal defense also need to realize it is not a ball tackling defense. It is a defense based on support and designed to intercept passes to start counter attacks from. Therefore it is helpful to know another set of cues that provide a guideline for when to attempt to tackle the ball away from a ball carrier.
1) Establish containment of the attack. Slow forward progress by giving ground while staying in front of the attacker.
2) Make the attacker predictable. Force the attacker to move laterally in one direction towards support provided by a teammate.
3) The time to attempt a tackle is when the ball is outside of the attackers footprints or has been mis-touched too far away from him to maintain control. When the ball is between the attackers feet, the defender can be defeated to either side - the attacker has the advantage. WAIT, be patient until you have the advantage.
What about backs stepping to win 50 / 50 balls?
I will answer that question with one of my own: Do you have teammates in support of your attempt to win a 50 / 50 ball? If not, you must be 100% confident that you will win the 50 / 50 ball. Otherwise, organize as a back line unit and prepare to play the second ball by getting into the anticipation area. In this case the anticipaton area can serve dual purpose by also being the start of an early retreat giving the backs options for play.
Okay, that is a brief overview of negative space and the strategy behind early retreats. Watch the USWNT and USMNT as they both practice early retreats. Especially the women's side. It is a terrifically sound strategy once it is understood and executed properly. Hope this has been helpful to you.
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Showing posts with label 50 / 50 balls. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 50 / 50 balls. Show all posts
Tuesday
Thursday
Johan Cruyff on Running in Soccer and 50 / 50 balls
Johan Cruyff has stated: “All coaches talk too much
about running a lot. I say it’s not necessary to run so much. Soccer
is a game that’s played with the brain. You need to be in the
right place at the right time, not too early, not too late. If it’s only about
running, then you create a running game. I don’t think it is a running game. It
is a beautiful game. It is about rhythm and dictating the tempo, and so on. Not
only about playing forward, but about the journey the ball takes as it is moved
toward goal. In order to protect the goal, you should protect the ball. That
means you must be comfortable with the ball – first touch, shielding, passing,
bending, shooting the ball. Isn't that the key, you don't have to win physical
battles if you don't get into them. If the ball's always on the ground who cares
if the kid's not good in the air. If you're not creating 50/50 balls you don't
need the kids who can win most of them."
Monday
Friday
We need a new goalkeeper! Analyzing Goals.
Goalkeepers are the last line of defense. The lasting impression many will have when their team is scored upon is of the goalkeeper's failed attempt to prevent the score. Some will be supportive of the goalkeepers efforts and others will make comments like "He should've made that save!" or "We need a new goalkeeper!"
In the article I Learned Attacking Soccer from a Goalkeeper Coach I relate of learning the importance of analyzing goals from current Anderson College coach John Murphy. If we wish to prevent future goals we must learn from the goals we have allowed, and even those our team has scored. While it's easy to blame the goalkeeper as the last line of defense I have fond that less than 10% of high school goals scored can be solely attributed to goalkeeper error.
In reviewing video of a recent high school match it occurred to me the goals one team allowed were ideal to illustrate that goals often originate from far out on the pitch. There usually exists a chain of events that lead up to that heart dropping moment when the ball gets by the goalkeeper. The idea here is not to transfer blame from the goalkeeper to a field player, but to demonstrate that there is a shared responsibility.
We will need to set the background in order to develop as complete an understanding as possible. The defending team in this case plays a 1-4-3-3 formation with a well defined attacking system. It's defensive system is flawed both it construct and, of course, in execution. They employ a zonal back 4 with a holding mid and two attacking mids manning the midfield triangle. Three forwards with the wing forwards responsible for weak side width on defense.
GK = Goalkeeper
RB = Right Back
RCB = Right Center Back
LCB = Left Center Back
LB = Left Back
HM = Holding Midfielder
AM = Attacking Midfielder
RW = Right Wing Forward
CF = Center Forward
LW = Left Wing Forward
Goal #1
This goal is scored off a break away but actually originates from action off an opposition goal kick.
The opposing GK played a goal kick into a gusting wind of 15-20 mph. A wind of this strength indicates that a short goal kick is likely to occur. It is quite possible the ball might be blown back towards the GK if played high enough that the wind catches it. Therefore the defending teams forwards must not only guard against a short goal kick but also be prepared to play the anticipation area on a longer kick that will be played by their midfield or back line teammates.
In this case, the teams HM won a flighted ball with a leaping header playing the ball strongly back up the field. This is where the goal originates. There are only 3 opposing players in the anticipation area. Neither the AM's, or any of the three forwards are present to play their teammates header
Naturally an opponent won the ball and immediately made a long ground service through the defense. The best pass in soccer is one that successfully defeats as many opponents as possible. In this instance the pass defeated seven players -both AM's, the HM and the entire back line.
Film shows no pressure on the passer and both the LCB and RCB advanced 7-10 yards out of position. The pass went through the center channels to an opposing forward bending off a flat run behind the LCB and RCB.
It is important to note at this time that the RCB was not only advanced but also in the right outside channel. The LCB was even further advanced and in the right center channel. The teams LB was in the left center channel. This is an extremely odd deployment given the ball has been located located centrally in the teams atacking third. Only the teams RB appears to have been positioned properly and his role was being duplicated by the RCB.
It is also important to note that with no pressure on the ball carrier / passer the cue for the backs is to "retreat" in order to deny negative space between the backs and their GK. While two of the tactical cues for pressing were technically present - 50/50 ball and an opponent restart - it was within the purview of the midfielders to press, not the backs.
Because the RCB was out of position both vertically and horizontally his pursuit angle to the play actually cut off the pursuit of the RB effectively eliminating the RB from the play. And because the LB was positioned in the left central channel his pursuit angle was much sharper than it should have been effectively eliminating himself from the play. As the opposing forward had a 10 yard head start on the RCB and LCB and was noticeably faster than either of them this was essentially a 1 v GK situation beginning 45 yards out from goal.
With the ball 45 yards from goal and on the attackers foot, the GK's role of sweeper / keeper was effectively eliminated. His only choice was to give ground and establish himself inside the penalty area. The attackers next touch pushed the ball 20 yards forward for him to run onto. This is the touch that the GK needed to cue on. The ball would next be touched at a distance of 25 yards from goal. The attackers first touch essentially resulted in a 50 / 50 ball to be contested between the goalkeeper and the attacker.
Unfortunately the GK had retreated all the way to inside the goal area. From this position he could not challenge for the 50 / 50 ball created by the attackers first touch. When the ball is off the attackers foot, the GK must take ground and close down the distance between himself and the attacker at a pace that matches the attacker pace. The GK had retreated himself out of position to do this.
One more small touch by the attacker put the ball inside the penalty area and the next touch found side netting at the back post from a distance of 16 yards. The goalkeeper remained 3 yards off the line and dove laterally in an attempt to make the save. Even with an properly executed diagonally forward collapse dive he may not have been able to make the save from that near his own goal line.
From this analysis it should be clear the goal allowed was because of total team breakdown.
1) The forwards did not play the anticipation zone nor did any of them pressure the opponent who would make the through pass.
2) The AM's did not play the anticipation area or support in behind the HM. They also did not pressure the opponent who would make the through pass.
3) The center backs were far too aggressive in their advanced position and completely missed the cue for early retreat. Instead of denying or shrinking the negative space between them and their GK, they actually aided the opponents by creating more space behind them for the opponents to play into and utilize against them.
4) The LB was out of position in the central channel and effectively eliminated himself from the play due to having too sharpe of a pursuit angle to run down the break away.
5) The RB. although positioned properly might have had the best chance to prevent the break away had he not read the cue for early treat correctly and had been improperly positioned inside behind the advanced RCB.
6) The GK completely misread the cues and failed to challenge the 50/50 ball created by the attacker breaking through. In missing this play he also eliminated any chance to "come out and close down the angles" as the attacker shot early from near the top of the penalty area. Lastly he dove laterally and again missed the opportunity to cut the angles on the shot.
Quite literally, all 11 players on the defending side played a role in this goal being scored against their team. A complete and total team breakdown on a play that originated 114 yards from their own goal.
In the article I Learned Attacking Soccer from a Goalkeeper Coach I relate of learning the importance of analyzing goals from current Anderson College coach John Murphy. If we wish to prevent future goals we must learn from the goals we have allowed, and even those our team has scored. While it's easy to blame the goalkeeper as the last line of defense I have fond that less than 10% of high school goals scored can be solely attributed to goalkeeper error.
In reviewing video of a recent high school match it occurred to me the goals one team allowed were ideal to illustrate that goals often originate from far out on the pitch. There usually exists a chain of events that lead up to that heart dropping moment when the ball gets by the goalkeeper. The idea here is not to transfer blame from the goalkeeper to a field player, but to demonstrate that there is a shared responsibility.
We will need to set the background in order to develop as complete an understanding as possible. The defending team in this case plays a 1-4-3-3 formation with a well defined attacking system. It's defensive system is flawed both it construct and, of course, in execution. They employ a zonal back 4 with a holding mid and two attacking mids manning the midfield triangle. Three forwards with the wing forwards responsible for weak side width on defense.
GK = Goalkeeper
RB = Right Back
RCB = Right Center Back
LCB = Left Center Back
LB = Left Back
HM = Holding Midfielder
AM = Attacking Midfielder
RW = Right Wing Forward
CF = Center Forward
LW = Left Wing Forward
Goal #1
This goal is scored off a break away but actually originates from action off an opposition goal kick.
The opposing GK played a goal kick into a gusting wind of 15-20 mph. A wind of this strength indicates that a short goal kick is likely to occur. It is quite possible the ball might be blown back towards the GK if played high enough that the wind catches it. Therefore the defending teams forwards must not only guard against a short goal kick but also be prepared to play the anticipation area on a longer kick that will be played by their midfield or back line teammates.
In this case, the teams HM won a flighted ball with a leaping header playing the ball strongly back up the field. This is where the goal originates. There are only 3 opposing players in the anticipation area. Neither the AM's, or any of the three forwards are present to play their teammates header
Naturally an opponent won the ball and immediately made a long ground service through the defense. The best pass in soccer is one that successfully defeats as many opponents as possible. In this instance the pass defeated seven players -both AM's, the HM and the entire back line.
Film shows no pressure on the passer and both the LCB and RCB advanced 7-10 yards out of position. The pass went through the center channels to an opposing forward bending off a flat run behind the LCB and RCB.
It is important to note at this time that the RCB was not only advanced but also in the right outside channel. The LCB was even further advanced and in the right center channel. The teams LB was in the left center channel. This is an extremely odd deployment given the ball has been located located centrally in the teams atacking third. Only the teams RB appears to have been positioned properly and his role was being duplicated by the RCB.
It is also important to note that with no pressure on the ball carrier / passer the cue for the backs is to "retreat" in order to deny negative space between the backs and their GK. While two of the tactical cues for pressing were technically present - 50/50 ball and an opponent restart - it was within the purview of the midfielders to press, not the backs.
Because the RCB was out of position both vertically and horizontally his pursuit angle to the play actually cut off the pursuit of the RB effectively eliminating the RB from the play. And because the LB was positioned in the left central channel his pursuit angle was much sharper than it should have been effectively eliminating himself from the play. As the opposing forward had a 10 yard head start on the RCB and LCB and was noticeably faster than either of them this was essentially a 1 v GK situation beginning 45 yards out from goal.
With the ball 45 yards from goal and on the attackers foot, the GK's role of sweeper / keeper was effectively eliminated. His only choice was to give ground and establish himself inside the penalty area. The attackers next touch pushed the ball 20 yards forward for him to run onto. This is the touch that the GK needed to cue on. The ball would next be touched at a distance of 25 yards from goal. The attackers first touch essentially resulted in a 50 / 50 ball to be contested between the goalkeeper and the attacker.
Unfortunately the GK had retreated all the way to inside the goal area. From this position he could not challenge for the 50 / 50 ball created by the attackers first touch. When the ball is off the attackers foot, the GK must take ground and close down the distance between himself and the attacker at a pace that matches the attacker pace. The GK had retreated himself out of position to do this.
One more small touch by the attacker put the ball inside the penalty area and the next touch found side netting at the back post from a distance of 16 yards. The goalkeeper remained 3 yards off the line and dove laterally in an attempt to make the save. Even with an properly executed diagonally forward collapse dive he may not have been able to make the save from that near his own goal line.
From this analysis it should be clear the goal allowed was because of total team breakdown.
1) The forwards did not play the anticipation zone nor did any of them pressure the opponent who would make the through pass.
2) The AM's did not play the anticipation area or support in behind the HM. They also did not pressure the opponent who would make the through pass.
3) The center backs were far too aggressive in their advanced position and completely missed the cue for early retreat. Instead of denying or shrinking the negative space between them and their GK, they actually aided the opponents by creating more space behind them for the opponents to play into and utilize against them.
4) The LB was out of position in the central channel and effectively eliminated himself from the play due to having too sharpe of a pursuit angle to run down the break away.
5) The RB. although positioned properly might have had the best chance to prevent the break away had he not read the cue for early treat correctly and had been improperly positioned inside behind the advanced RCB.
6) The GK completely misread the cues and failed to challenge the 50/50 ball created by the attacker breaking through. In missing this play he also eliminated any chance to "come out and close down the angles" as the attacker shot early from near the top of the penalty area. Lastly he dove laterally and again missed the opportunity to cut the angles on the shot.
Quite literally, all 11 players on the defending side played a role in this goal being scored against their team. A complete and total team breakdown on a play that originated 114 yards from their own goal.
Wednesday
Statistics: Quality of 1st touch
Unlike traditional American sports soccer does not keep many standard statistics for evaluating player performance. Sabremetrics has yet to find its way to grass roots soccer. Over a decade ago I began tracking what I refer to as "Quality of First Touch" statistics as a means to measure a players readiness to participate at a given level. I utilize a simple +/- system for tracking Quality of First Touch. What I am looking for is the players ability to gain and maintain possession with his first touch on the ball. I do not extend the evaluation to what he does beyond his first touch (shoot / pass / dribble). The focus is solely on a players first touch on the ball.
What I discovered was a varsity level player generally requires a Quality of First Touch of 80% or higher. In a really good program that number might approach 90% + to be a starter. I do "spot checks" of this statistic when scouting or watching soccer matches and this has held true throughout the years. I conducted such a survey again last night and the results remained startlingly consistent. The best players are the ones with the best Quality of First Touch.
As a coach, if I have a limited positions being contested by multiple players, I will often utilize Quality of First Touch statistics from tryouts and training to decide who wins those spots and who will be cut or relegated to a lower level team.
Players who are first to the ball, who win a lot of 50 / 50 balls but do so with a poor Quality of First Touch are not really winning the ball at all. They are creators of more 50 / 50 balls. Some coaches place a priority on players winning 50 / 50 balls and there is certainly value to winning 50 / 50 balls created by the opposing team. If it is your player or team that is creating a lot of 50 / 50 balls, chances are the lack of Quality of First Touch is a major contributing factor.
This all relates back to the recent posting on Pace of Play. If a team wishes to increase their pace of play it must be accomplished by increasing the Quality of their First Touch. This can be done by teaching them to play smarter through preparing to play properly so as to provide the best possible chance to have a high Quality of First Touch. Sometimes this involves slowing down a players physical pace of play so it is aligned with the players capabilities in mental pace of play.
The key to Quality of First Touch is found in a players ability to prepare properly before executing his first touch on the ball. Players whose primary focus is on being first to the ball often fail to have a plan for what they want to do with the ball once it is won. This can lead to frantic, if not panicked, play often resulting in poor Quality of First Touch and creation of yet another 50 / 50 ball to be won. It's a vicious cycle that must be avoided at all costs.
What I discovered was a varsity level player generally requires a Quality of First Touch of 80% or higher. In a really good program that number might approach 90% + to be a starter. I do "spot checks" of this statistic when scouting or watching soccer matches and this has held true throughout the years. I conducted such a survey again last night and the results remained startlingly consistent. The best players are the ones with the best Quality of First Touch.
As a coach, if I have a limited positions being contested by multiple players, I will often utilize Quality of First Touch statistics from tryouts and training to decide who wins those spots and who will be cut or relegated to a lower level team.
Players who are first to the ball, who win a lot of 50 / 50 balls but do so with a poor Quality of First Touch are not really winning the ball at all. They are creators of more 50 / 50 balls. Some coaches place a priority on players winning 50 / 50 balls and there is certainly value to winning 50 / 50 balls created by the opposing team. If it is your player or team that is creating a lot of 50 / 50 balls, chances are the lack of Quality of First Touch is a major contributing factor.
This all relates back to the recent posting on Pace of Play. If a team wishes to increase their pace of play it must be accomplished by increasing the Quality of their First Touch. This can be done by teaching them to play smarter through preparing to play properly so as to provide the best possible chance to have a high Quality of First Touch. Sometimes this involves slowing down a players physical pace of play so it is aligned with the players capabilities in mental pace of play.
The key to Quality of First Touch is found in a players ability to prepare properly before executing his first touch on the ball. Players whose primary focus is on being first to the ball often fail to have a plan for what they want to do with the ball once it is won. This can lead to frantic, if not panicked, play often resulting in poor Quality of First Touch and creation of yet another 50 / 50 ball to be won. It's a vicious cycle that must be avoided at all costs.
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